La “Executive
Order” (EO) del Presidente de EEUU relativa al control de contenidos en línea y
a la responsabilidad de las plataformas de Internet (“Preventing Online Censorship”),
adoptada el pasado jueves y que tiene amplio eco en los medios de comunicación
estos días, aborda cuestiones cuyo tratamiento en el seno de la Unión Europea
está también en proceso de revisión. En síntesis, dos son las cuestiones principales
a las que va referida la EO (cuyo texto reproduzco como Anexo al final de esta
reseña). De una parte, el debate acerca de qué reglas resulta adecuado imponer
a las plataformas en relación con su funcionamiento, en la medida en que la
posición alcanzada por algunas de ellas determina que sean un elemento esencial
para el ejercicio de derechos fundamentales como la libertad de expresión o de
información, que pueden justificar precisamente limitar la libertad de empresa
del proveedor para configurar su servicio habida cuenta de su especial
relevancia social. De otra parte, la EO pretende revisar el régimen de
responsabilidad de las plataformas en relación con los contenidos que sus
usuarios difunden a través de ellas. Un objetivo esencial de la EO es vincular
ambas cuestiones, con la idea de que la exención de responsabilidad de las
plataformas por contenidos de sus usuarios únicamente debe beneficiar a
aquellas cuyo funcionamiento no imponga restricciones a los contenidos que sus
usuarios difunden. Aunque el marco legal del régimen de responsabilidad de los
intermediarios de Internet, como las plataformas, difiere sustancialmente entre
EEUU y la UE -dejando a un lado el tratamiento específico de las infracciones
de derechos de autor que además queda al margen de la EO-, resulta claro que la
situación en EEUU ejerce una gran influencia en la UE, en particular en la
medida en que las plataformas más significativas se han extendido desde EEUU,
tratando de trasladar al resto del mundo, y en particular a Europa, un modelo
de negocio diseñado a partir del marco normativo estadounidense, en un contexto
en el que la aplicación efectiva de los estándares (más restrictivos) previstos
en otras legislaciones ha presentado importantes carencias. Más allá de hacer referencia
al contenido y la limitada eficacia práctica de la EO en el contexto de la
legislación estadounidense, puede ser útil reflexionar acerca de si la
modificación que se pretende llevar a cabo en EEUU se corresponde con la
situación en la UE.
En la medida
en que el marco legal existente en EEUU no puede ser modificado mediante la EO,
el núcleo de este instrumento –que se corresponde con su sección segunda-
promueve una determinada interpretación de ese marco legal de cara a ser
aplicada en el ámbito administrativo y en la eventual adopción de normativa de
desarrollo. Habida cuenta de que ese marco legal es reflejo de la importancia
capital atribuida en el sistema de EEUU a la libertad de expresión de la
Primera Enmienda de su Constitución, su interpretación –objeto ya de una
abundante jurisprudencia- no parece que pueda venir determinada por la EO ni
por las medidas en el ámbito administrativo a las que pueda dar lugar, cuya compatibilidad
con la propia Primera Enmienda ya ha sido cuestionada por sus críticos (véase,
por ejemplo, aquí) y es algo acerca
de lo que eventualmente se tendrán que pronunciar los tribunales.
Es conocido
que el marco legal básico de EEUU en materia de responsabilidad de los
prestadores de servicios de intermediación en Internet, como es el caso de las
plataformas, está recogido en dos instrumentos: la sección 230(c) de la CommunicationsDecency Act (CDA) y la Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Esta última contempla un régimen
específico para favorecer la tutela de los derechos de autor, en el que se
inspiró el legislador europeo al establecer las normas de la Directiva 2000/31
sobre el comercio electrónico (DCE, en particular su artículo 14, traspuesto en
el artículo 16 de la Ley 34/2002 de servicios de la sociedad de la información,
LSSI), que –a diferencia de la DMCA- se aplican con carácter horizontal (es
decir, con independencia de la materia a la que vaya referida la
responsabilidad) y no solo en materia de propiedad intelectual. Por su parte,
con carácter previo –en 1996- la CDA, a partir de la importancia atribuida a la
libertad de expresión en EEUU y con el propósito de favorecer el desarrollo de
Internet, estableció una amplísima exención de responsabilidad a favor de los
intermediarios de Internet en relación con los contenidos que se difundan a
través de sus servicios, que es de aplicación con carácter general, salvo en
materia de derechos de autor. El texto de la sección 230(c) de la CDA es el
siguiente:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan”
blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability. No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or
make available to information content providers or others the technical means
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
La sección
230(c)(1) CDA adopta en principio un estándar muy diferente al del artículo 14
DCE (16 y 17 LSSI), en la medida en que proporciona al intermediario una
protección prácticamente absoluta que lo exime de responsabilidad por los
contenidos difundidos por sus usuarios, al establecer que en ningún caso será
tratado como proveedor de los contenidos o responsable de su publicación cuando
hayan sido proporcionados por terceros. Frente a ese modelo, el prevalente en
Europa, en el que la ponderación entre los derechos fundamentales que pueden
resultar implicados –por ejemplo, la libertad de expresión y el derecho al
honor o a la intimidad- es diferente (principalmente por el distinto alcance
atribuido a la libertad de expresión) requiere en la práctica valorar a la luz
de las circunstancias del caso si el intermediario que pretende beneficiarse de
la limitación de responsabilidad actuó con el nivel de diligencia que le es
exigible para poder apreciar que no tuvo conocimiento efectivo de la ilicitud
de los contenidos difundidos por el usuario a través de sus servicios. Se trata
de un estándar cuya aplicación, condicionada por la evolución de los modelos de
negocio, requiere un análisis casuístico –por ejemplo, cuanto mayor sea el
riesgo inherente al modelo del negocio del intermediario, mayor ha de ser el
nivel de diligencia exigible-, como se desprende de las fundamentales aportaciones del TJUE y del TEDH.
Ahora bien, en
la aplicación de estas exenciones de responsabilidad hay otro aspecto
fundamental, que es la concreción de quiénes pueden beneficiarse de las mismas.
En el caso de la UE resulta clave, conforme a la jurisprudencia del TJUE, a
partir de su sentencia L’Oréal, y del
considerando 42 de la propia DCE, que la actividad del prestador de servicios
sea “de naturaleza meramente técnica, automática y pasiva” para que pueda
beneficiarse del régimen de protección de los intermediarios. La concreción de
este extremo con respecto a las plataformas de Internet resulta de gran
importancia práctica y plantea todavía interrogantes, que las varias cuestiones
actualmente pendientes ante el Tribunal de Justicia sobre este particular
deberían contribuir a resolver. En todo caso, con respecto a los contenidos de
terceros que una plataforma valora, prioriza,
o recomienda a sus usuarios hay motivos para sostener que no desempeña
una actividad meramente pasiva o neutral, como exige la DCE, lo que
determinaría que no pudiera beneficiarse de la limitación de responsabilidad del
artículo 14 DCE. No obstante, el no beneficiarse de la inmunidad no equivale a ser
responsable sino que esto ha de ser valorado en cada cado en función de la
normativa aplicable en el ámbito de responsabilidad de que se trate.
La EO pretende
una evolución del marco existente en EEUU en lo relativo a la concreción de
quiénes pueden beneficiarse de la inmunidad de la sección 230(c)(1) CDA, como vía
para combatir lo que denomina censura en Internet de la plataformas. Considera
que una interpretación conjunta del subapartado 1 de la sección 230(c) con su subapartado
2 debe llevar a considerar que quienes restringen el acceso a ciertos
contenidos más allá de lo previsto en ese subapartado 2 no pueden beneficiarse
de la exención y deben ser equiparados a un proveedor de contenidos, de modo
que pueden ser responsable de lo que otros difunden a través de sus servicios.
En principio, puede considerarse que se trata de un planteamiento semejante,
salvando todas las distancia, al que prevalece en la UE en relación con la
exigencia de que la actividad del prestador de servicios sea de naturaleza
meramente técnica, automática y pasiva. Sin embargo, en la práctica entre el
enfoque de la EO y la situación en la UE subsisten significativas diferencias.
La EO pretende favorecer la ausencia de control de contenidos por las
plataformas, lo que no se corresponde con el estándar basado en la diligencia
debida de la DCE. En todo caso, la ausencia de control en el modelo de EEUU se
basa en la consideración de las salvaguardas previstas en los subapartados (1)
y (2) de la sección 230(c) como garantías independientes, situación que la EO
cuestiona, tal como se ha puesto de relieve al criticarla (aquí).
Más allá de la defensa de la no intervención de las plataformas -sin perjuicio de que
la concreción de cuándo las medidas restrictivas pueden entenderse "taken
in good faith" y estar justificadas resultará en todo caso controvertido-,
la EO no incluye medidas específicas relativas al funcionamiento de las
plataformas del tipo de las contenidas en el Reglamento (UE) 2019/1150 (aquí) y de las que previsiblemente
adoptara la UE en relación con otros usuarios de plataformas (aquí).
ANEXO
EXECUTIVE ORDER
- - - - - - -
PREVENTING ONLINE
CENSORSHIP
By the authority
vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy.
Free speech is the bedrock of American democracy. Our Founding Fathers
protected this sacred right with the First Amendment to the Constitution. The
freedom to express and debate ideas is the foundation for all of our rights as
a free people.
In a country that has
long cherished the freedom of expression, we cannot allow a limited number of
online platforms to hand pick the speech that Americans may access and convey
on the internet. This practice is fundamentally un-American and
anti-democratic. When large, powerful social media companies censor opinions
with which they disagree, they exercise a dangerous power. They cease
functioning as passive bulletin boards, and ought to be viewed and treated as
content creators.
The growth of online
platforms in recent years raises important questions about applying the ideals
of the First Amendment to modern communications technology. Today, many
Americans follow the news, stay in touch with friends and family, and share
their views on current events through social media and other online platforms.
As a result, these platforms function in many ways as a 21st century equivalent
of the public square.
Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, and YouTube wield immense, if not unprecedented, power to shape the
interpretation of public events; to censor, delete, or disappear information;
and to control what people see or do not see.
As President, I have
made clear my commitment to free and open debate on the internet. Such debate
is just as important online as it is in our universities, our town halls, and
our homes. It is essential to sustaining our democracy.
Online platforms are
engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national discourse. Tens
of thousands of Americans have reported, among other troubling behaviors,
online platforms "flagging" content as inappropriate, even though it
does not violate any stated terms of service; making unannounced and
unexplained changes to company policies that have the effect of disfavoring
certain viewpoints; and deleting content and entire accounts with no warning,
no rationale, and no recourse.
Twitter now
selectively decides to place a warning label on certain tweets in a manner that
clearly reflects political bias. As has been reported, Twitter seems never to
have placed such a label on another politician's tweet. As recently as last
week, Representative Adam Schiff was continuing to mislead his followers by
peddling the long-disproved Russian Collusion Hoax, and Twitter did not flag
those tweets. Unsurprisingly, its officer in charge of so-called "Site
Integrity" has flaunted his political bias in his own tweets.
At the same time
online platforms are invoking inconsistent, irrational, and groundless
justifications to censor or otherwise restrict Americans' speech here at home,
several online platforms are profiting from and promoting the aggression and
disinformation spread by foreign governments like China. One United States
company, for example, created a search engine for the Chinese Communist Party
that would have blacklisted searches for "human rights," hid data
unfavorable to the Chinese Communist Party, and tracked users determined
appropriate for surveillance. It also established research partnerships in
China that provide direct benefits to the Chinese military. Other companies
have accepted advertisements paid for by the Chinese government that spread
false information about China's mass imprisonment of religious minorities,
thereby enabling these abuses of human rights. They have also amplified China's
propaganda abroad, including by allowing Chinese government officials to use
their platforms to spread misinformation regarding the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic, and to undermine pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.
As a Nation, we must
foster and protect diverse viewpoints in today's digital communications
environment where all Americans can and should have a voice. We must seek
transparency and accountability from online platforms, and encourage standards
and tools to protect and preserve the integrity and openness of American
discourse and freedom of expression.
Sec. 2. Protections
Against Online Censorship. (a) It is the policy of the United States to foster
clear ground rules promoting free and open debate on the internet. Prominent
among the ground rules governing that debate is the immunity from liability
created by section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (section 230(c)).
47 U.S.C. 230(c). It is the policy of the United States that the scope of that
immunity should be clarified: the immunity should not extend beyond its text and
purpose to provide protection for those who purport to provide users a forum
for free and open speech, but in reality use their power over a vital means of
communication to engage in deceptive or pretextual actions stifling free and
open debate by censoring certain viewpoints.
Section 230(c) was
designed to address early court decisions holding that, if an online platform
restricted access to some content posted by others, it would thereby become a
"publisher" of all the content posted on its site for purposes of
torts such as defamation. As the title of section 230(c) makes clear, the
provision provides limited liability "protection" to a provider of an
interactive computer service (such as an online platform) that engages in
"'Good Samaritan' blocking" of harmful content. In particular, the
Congress sought to provide protections for online platforms that attempted to
protect minors from harmful content and intended to ensure that such providers
would not be discouraged from taking down harmful material. The provision was
also intended to further the express vision of the Congress that the internet
is a "forum for a true diversity of political discourse." 47 U.S.C.
230(a)(3). The limited protections provided by the statute should be construed
with these purposes in mind.
In particular,
subparagraph (c)(2) expressly addresses protections from "civil
liability" and specifies that an interactive computer service provider may
not be made liable "on account of" its decision in "good
faith" to restrict access to content that it considers to be
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or
otherwise objectionable." It is the policy of the United States to ensure
that, to the maximum extent permissible under the law, this provision is not
distorted to provide liability protection for online platforms that -- far from
acting in "good faith" to remove objectionable content -- instead
engage in deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated terms
of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they disagree. Section 230 was not
intended to allow a handful of companies to grow into titans controlling vital
avenues for our national discourse under the guise of promoting open forums for
debate, and then to provide those behemoths blanket immunity when they use
their power to censor content and silence viewpoints that they dislike. When an
interactive computer service provider removes or restricts access to content
and its actions do not meet the criteria of subparagraph (c)(2)(A), it is engaged
in editorial conduct. It is the policy of the United States that such a
provider should properly lose the limited liability shield of subparagraph
(c)(2)(A) and be exposed to liability like any traditional editor and publisher
that is not an online provider.
(b) To advance the
policy described in subsection (a) of this section, all executive departments
and agencies should ensure that their application of section 230(c) properly
reflects the narrow purpose of the section and take all appropriate actions in
this regard. In addition, within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Attorney General,
and acting through the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), shall file a petition for rulemaking with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) requesting that the FCC expeditiously propose
regulations to clarify:
(i) the interaction
between subparagraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of section 230, in particular to
clarify and determine the circumstances under which a provider of an
interactive computer service that restricts access to content in a manner not
specifically protected by subparagraph (c)(2)(A) may also not be able to claim
protection under subparagraph (c)(1), which merely states that a provider shall
not be treated as a publisher or speaker for making third-party content
available and does not address the provider's responsibility for its own
editorial decisions;
(ii) the conditions
under which an action restricting access to or availability of material is not
"taken in good faith" within the meaning of subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of
section 230, particularly whether actions can be "taken in good
faith" if they are:
(A) deceptive,
pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider's terms of service; or
(B) taken after
failing to provide adequate notice, reasoned explanation, or a meaningful
opportunity to be heard; and
(iii) any other
proposed regulations that the NTIA concludes may be appropriate to advance the
policy described in subsection (a) of this section.
Sec. 3. Protecting
Federal Taxpayer Dollars from Financing Online Platforms That Restrict Free
Speech. (a) The head of each executive department and agency (agency) shall
review its agency's Federal spending on advertising and marketing paid to
online platforms. Such review shall include the amount of money spent, the
online platforms that receive Federal dollars, and the statutory authorities
available to restrict their receipt of advertising dollars.
(b) Within 30 days of the
date of this order, the head of each agency shall report its findings to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(c) The Department of
Justice shall review the viewpoint-based speech restrictions imposed by each
online platform identified in the report described in subsection (b) of this
section and assess whether any online platforms are problematic vehicles for
government speech due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, or
other bad practices.
Sec. 4. Federal Review
of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices. (a) It is the policy of the United
States that large online platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, as the
critical means of promoting the free flow of speech and ideas today, should not
restrict protected speech. The Supreme Court has noted that social media sites,
as the modern public square, "can provide perhaps the most powerful
mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard."
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). Communication
through these channels has become important for meaningful participation in
American democracy, including to petition elected leaders. These sites are
providing an important forum to the public for others to engage in free
expression and debate. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
85-89 (1980).
(b) In May of 2019,
the White House launched a Tech Bias Reporting tool to allow Americans to
report incidents of online censorship. In just weeks, the White House received
over 16,000 complaints of online platforms censoring or otherwise taking action
against users based on their political viewpoints. The White House will submit
such complaints received to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).
(c) The FTC shall consider
taking action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to prohibit
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, pursuant to
section 45 of title 15, United States Code. Such unfair or deceptive acts or
practice may include practices by entities covered by section 230 that restrict
speech in ways that do not align with those entities' public representations
about those practices.
(d) For large online
platforms that are vast arenas for public debate, including the social media
platform Twitter, the FTC shall also, consistent with its legal authority,
consider whether complaints allege violations of law that implicate the
policies set forth in section 4(a) of this order. The FTC shall consider
developing a report describing such complaints and making the report publicly
available, consistent with applicable law.
Sec. 5. State Review
of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices and Anti-Discrimination Laws. (a) The
Attorney General shall establish a working group regarding the potential
enforcement of State statutes that prohibit online platforms from engaging in
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The working group shall also develop
model legislation for consideration by legislatures in States where existing
statutes do not protect Americans from such unfair and deceptive acts and
practices. The working group shall invite State Attorneys General for
discussion and consultation, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.
(b) Complaints
described in section 4(b) of this order will be shared with the working group,
consistent with applicable law. The working group shall also collect publicly
available information regarding the following:
(i) increased scrutiny
of users based on the other users they choose to follow, or their interactions
with other users;
(ii) algorithms to
suppress content or users based on indications of political alignment or
viewpoint;
(iii) differential
policies allowing for otherwise impermissible behavior, when committed by
accounts associated with the Chinese Communist Party or other anti-democratic
associations or governments;
(iv) reliance on
third-party entities, including contractors, media
organizations, and
individuals, with indicia of bias to review content; and
(v) acts that limit
the ability of users with particular viewpoints to earn money on the platform
compared with other users similarly situated.
Sec. 6. Legislation.
The Attorney General shall develop a proposal for Federal legislation that
would be useful to promote the policy objectives of this order.
Sec. 7. Definition.
For purposes of this order, the term "online platform" means any
website or application that allows users to create and share content or engage
in social networking, or any general search engine.
Sec. 8. General
Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise
affect:
(i) the authority
granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary,
administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall
be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability
of appropriations.
(c) This order is not
intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or
agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 28, 2020.
